| Dual connectivity perspective evolution of networks under attack using the diameter as proxy for connectivity. Diameter in the Active Network, AN (red) and Idle Network, IN (blue) for the lattice, Tokunaga Tree and BA networks with respect to three different sequential node removal strategies: panels a, d, g -random failure, b, e, h -targeted attack, and c, f, i -random spreading. The time are normalized by the system size. The diameter at time t is computed as the longest distance (measured in terms of number of edges) in between any pair of nodes within the network, given that both nodes belong to the same component (cluster). The lack of a general symmetry, even complementariness, revealed by the temporal evolution of the largest cluster size in both AN and IN (see Fig. 2 ) are confirmed by the evolution of the diameter highlighting the necessity to monitor both networks (AN and IN) to assess the overall network robustness.
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